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Ukraine's long-standing strategy of managing interdependence while avoiding re-integration with Russia had served it with some measure of success. Moscow's renewed resolve to use Eurasian integration as a means of re-establishing its sphere of influence, however, meant that Kiev's strategy was becoming increasingly obsolete. Soon after Yanukovych's coming to power in 2010, Russia made another attempt to attract Ukraine to its own integration bloc. As in the past, Russia's support for Yanukovych's campaign was conditional on Ukraine committing to closer integration. Yet, such was Russia's resolve that this time the offer no longer allowed for selective or 'soft' formats. Russia's plans de facto required that Ukraine abandon its European integration ambitions and commit to the Eurasian regime. Thereafter, the Russia-led bloc would negotiate relations with the EU: this way reaching Europe could be achieved via Eurasia. Gradually, Russia showed some flexibility in accepting transitional arrangements. Yet this flexibility had clear limits: Ukraine's journey to the Eurasian Union could be slow, but it could not be secondary to integration with Europe via the Association Agreement.
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of Russia's renewed integration offer, its evolution and the tools used to attract Ukraine and dissuade it from signing the Agreement with the EU. We examine Ukraine's response to this offer and the search for a formula to satisfy Russia while stopping short of membership of the Eurasian regime. We show how, ultimately, this search for a 'third way' -more than cooperation but less than integration -over 2011-13 backfired, making Ukraine more vulnerable to Russia than ever, without securing the benefits sought by the Ukrainian authorities.
Yanukovych's economic priorities
Despite Yanukovych's electoral promise of closer ties with Russia, he approached Russia strictly as a strategic economic partner (2010). This partnership was narrowly defined in terms of ensuring favourable and predictable terms of trade and lower energy prices. This was a particularly high priority at this time: Yanukovych had come to power following a period of acrimonious relations with Russia under Yushchenko, including the 2009 'energy war' , which, along with the painful consequences of the financial crisis, had dented the income of Ukrainian oligarchs.
